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Abstract
The first chapter consists of two essays. The first essay studies if and how consumers
search for low prices (bargains). Using a panel of prices and quantities of consumer
purchases measured at the UPC-level, I find that consumers paid lower prices after
the Great Recession which is interpreted as an outcome of increased search intensity.
There is large heterogeneity among consumers. I categorize consumers, by year, into
three types by the degree of search intensity: bargain hunters, average consumers,
and inattentive shoppers and find that consumer types are not very persistent. Fur-
ther,I find that consumers rationally search for lower prices for product categories of
which they consume a lot while they search less for lower prices for products they
consume less of. I write a simple model of shopping time allocation for two goods
which rationalizes that consumers will search more intensively for lower prices on the
good on which they spends more. In addition, we find evidence that in the recession
consumers pay more shopping trips and visit more stores to search for bargains. In
the second essay, Adopting the framework of Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha (1996),
I identity three channels of wage income smoothing: net taxes, employers, and in-
terstate commuting income. They smooth 1.8%, 55.1% and 3.0%, respectively, of
shocks to Gross State Product (GSP). 40.1% of shocks are not smoothed. I split the
sample into four non-overlapping time periods and find the shares of net taxes on
production and employers change significantly over time. Lastly, I test the asym-
metry of wage income smoothing over the business cycle. The responses of wage
incomes to GSP shocks exhibit a reversed “rockets and feathers” feature, i.e. wage
incomes respond stronger and faster to negative shocks than positive shocks.
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Chapter 1
Heterogeneous Consumer
Shopping Behavior: Evidence from
Retail Scanner Data
1
1.1 Introduction
How do heterogeneous consumers shop? A consumer can increase his or her search
intensity by spending more time on shopping and thereby lowering expenditure in
different ways: buying during sales, using coupons, and switching to generic brand
products. Since the seminal work by Aguiar and Hurst (2005), it has been well
known that consumers with certain demographic characteristics, such as retirement
and non-employment, pay lower prices than others.
It would be interesting to further exploit heterogeneity in consumer shopping be-
havior and its evolution over the business cycle. Does a consumer’s search intensity
respond to the business cycle? If so, is there a difference in the response across con-
sumers grouped by demographic characteristics? Does a consumer have a consistent
level of search intensity over all goods she buys? To shed light on these issues, we
conduct a systematic study of heterogeneity in consumer shopping behavior using
data from the IRI Academic Data Set, which contains 11 years of weekly store data
for 30 grocery categories and panel data of household purchase transactions in two
pilot markets, Pittsfield, Massachusetts and Eau Claire, Wisconsin. Complementary
to Aguiar and Hurst (2005), we find large heterogeneity of search intensity within
each age group and across products.
Our work is also one of the first papers studying the business cycle aspect of
bargain hunting. The existing literature is mostly cross-sectional and do not explore
the business cycle dimension of consumption using retail scanner data. A notable
exception is Nevo and Wong (2014), to which our paper is closely related. They also
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find that households across demographic groups change their shopping behaviors
during the Great Recession.
We start by constructing a bargain hunting index (BHI) as a measure of search
intensity. For each household, we compute BHI by comparing the expenditure they
pay for their consumption bundle, to the hypothetical expenditure of the same bundle
if “average” market prices were paid instead. We categorize households into three
types. A household is defined as a bargain hunter in a year if the BHI lies in the
bottom quartile, an inattentive shopper if the BHI in the top quartile, or an average
consumer if the BHI in the other two quartiles. We also calculate the BHI for
each product category and define a consumer type for all product categories that a
household purchases.
We regress the household BHI on demographic variables and city unemployment
rates over the period from 2001 to 2011. Consistent with the literature (Aguiar and
Hurst (2007), Kaplan and Menzio (2014)), we find that households who are older,
have non-employed members and lower incomes pay lower prices. In addition, during
the Great Recession, households increased their search intensity. Similar to Nevo and
Wong (2014), we also find households exposing to different levels of income shocks
changed their search intensity to varying extent. Specifically, households whose head
was in retirement did not increase their search intensity as much as others, while
those whose head is non-employed increased their search intensity even more than
others.
Another contribution to the literature is a deepening understanding of time allo-
cation in the home production model (Benhabib, Rogerson and Wright (1991) and
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Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991)). When there is a negative income shock, individ-
uals substitute between time and market goods, and then smooth their consumption
by spending more time on shopping to lower the effective price they pay. We study
the intratemporal allocation of shopping time at a more granular level—between
product categories. A household is more likely being a bargain hunter and less likely
being an inattentive shopper for a product category on which she spends more. This
finding suggests consumers do not evenly allocate their search effort and instead de-
vote more search effort to product categories on which they spend more. We also
find that after the Great Recession, on average households became bargain hunters
for more product categories and inattentive shoppers for fewer categories.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature
while Section 3 describes the data. In Section 4, we display the shape of the bargain
hunting index and study heterogeneity in bargain hunting across demographic groups.
In Section 5, we present the determinants of bargain hunting and the effect of income
shocks and, in Section 6, we show the concentration of savings from bargain hunting.
Section 7 is the conclusion.
1.2 Literature Review
This paper is closely related to Nevo and Wong (2014). They find that changes in
shopping patterns occur over the business cycle. Households across demographic
groups purchase more sale items, use more coupons, buy more generic products
and large sized items, and spend a larger share of expenditure on Big Box stores,
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all of which contributes to lower effective prices paid by households, during the
Great Recession. Continuing this direction of research, we also find that the local
unemployment rate is a determinant of bargain hunting. During the Great Recession,
households whose heads are non-employed and thus having more difficulty in coming
back to employment pay 0.36 percent less than households whose heads are employed,
in response to an 1% increase in the local unemployment rate.
Our work relates to various strands of the literature on consumer shopping be-
havior and self-insurance. First, our work relates to recent studies on opportunity
cost of time over the business cycle. Aside from formal savings and public insurance,
households can also smooth unanticipated income shocks by spending more time on
shopping when the opportunity cost of time is low in a recession. Nevo and Wong
(2014) find that households’ opportunity cost of time declined by 25-30 percent over
2008-2010. Aguiar, Hurst and Karabarbounis (2013) show that around 30 percent
of the lost labor hours are reallocated toward non-market work, including shopping,
during the Great Recession. Our work quantifies the amount of change in the de-
crease of bargain hunting index, the consequence of increased shopping time and
efforts by consumers, in the Great Recession.
Second, our study of shopping activities adds to the literature of inattentive
consumers. Reis (2006) studies the consumption decisions of agents who face costs
of acquiring, absorbing and processing information. With such costs, consumers
rationally update their consumption plans only occasionally which implies a slow
adjustment of consumption to news. In his model, individual consumption is sensitive
to ordinary and unexpected past news, but not to extraordinary or predictable events
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as it pays to reconsider consumption plans when the economic circumstances change
substantially. Our work gives direct empirical evidence for the theory of rational
inattentive consumers. Households who spend more on a product category are less
likely to be inattentive consumers of that category.
Third, our paper complements studies on consumer heterogeneity. Chevalier and
Kashyap (2011) posit a model with two types of consumers, (1) loyals who stick to
their preferred brands and do not time their purchases and (2) shoppers who pay the
best price possible as they chase discounts, substitute across brands and/or stockpile
products during sales. Our results provide further evidence of this model. Bargain
hunters and inattentive consumers, as defined in our data, correspond to ”shoppers”
and ”loyals” in their model. They indeed display different shopping behaviors and
the difference between two groups of average price indexes change over the business
cycle.
Fourth, several influential papers (Diamond 1971, Bils and Klenow 2004, and
Nakamura and Steinsson 2011) have studied the frequency of price adjustments using
micro-level price data. Price setting has important implications for a variety of issues
in macroeconomics such as optimal monetary policy design or the welfare costs of
business cycles. Our work is closely related to Coibion, Gorodnichenko and Hong
(2015) (hereafter CGH 2015), who investigate to what extent the prices “posted” by
retailers differ from the “effective” (or actual) prices paid by households. Substitution
bias (buying less expensive goods) and the reallocation of expenditures across stores
(switching to cheaper stores) by households are two distinct mechanisms which could
drive down the cost of consumers’ baskets during recessions, opening a wedge between
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both prices. CGH (2015) document that actual prices are more flexible than posted
prices and that sales are pro-cyclical—sales are both less frequent and less sizable
when unemployment rates are high. The authors argue that store switching can
account for both facts, the wedge between both prices and the pro-cyclicality of sales.
High-price retailers might have less incentives to initiate sales during recessions when
households have more incentives to search for bargains at low-price retailers instead
(time-varying searching effort). Store switching can drive a wedge between posted
and effective prices at the individual product level. We use the same dataset as CGH
(2015), very detailed supermarket transaction records collected by IRI, but unlike
the previous study we have data for the period of the Great Recession while CGH
(2015) focus on the years 2001–2007.
The Great Recession certainly qualifies as an extraordinary event that should
have focused the attention of many consumers at the same time. It is only natural
to ask if the fraction of inattentive consumers varies over the business cycle, or if
loyals are more likely to become shoppers in such situations. As Aguiar, Hurst and
Karabarbounis (2013) document, time-use allocations change during recessions. In
the last recession, home production absorbed about 30 percent of foregone market
work hours (the rest going to leisure and other activities). Of that 30 percent, 7
percent represents increases in shopping time, 15 percent goes to core home pro-
duction (cooking, cleaning, laundry, etc.) while the rest goes to home maintenance
and repairs, and caring for other older adults. Aguiar and Hurst (2007) show that
households can and do alter the relationship between consumption and expenditure
by changing time inputs. In fact, older individuals pay less for the same products
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because they spend more time shopping and are more likely to use discounts. Unlike
Aguiar and Hurst (2007), who focus on the relationship between consumption and
expenditure over the life cycle, our focus is on the business cycle.
1.3 Data Description
1.3.1 IRI Academic Data Set
In this paper we use the IRI academic data set, which has very detailed information
on grocery purchases over 2001-2011 in 31 categories from 50 markets (each roughly
corresponding to a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA)). Transaction prices and
quantities are collected both at the store level and the individual transaction level.
The data set is described in details in Bronnerberg et al.(2008).
At the store level, weekly total sales and quantity data for each UPC (Universal
Product Code) are collected for stores in all 50 markets. A UPC is the barcode used
for scanning at the point of sales. Information of the transaction including the price
and quantity of each product bought by the consumer is transmitted to the retailer’s
database. There are two types of stores in the data: grocery stores and drug stores.
Many stores are chains of the same retailer, but each store has a unique identifier
and chain number, from which we can track the weekly revenue and quantity for
every UPC sold in the store over time. Retailers (or chains of retailers) cannot be
identified by name.
At the individual transaction level, the household panel records prices and quan-
tities for all transactions made by households in two small metropolitan areas: Eau
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Claire, Wisconsin and Pittsfield, Massachusetts. Every entry in the household panel
is a transaction of a product, narrowly defined by the UPC, made by a household at
a particular time. We also know certain household characteristics: household heads’
age, race, marital status, education, employment status, occupation, family size,
household income and home ownership. All these variables are categorical variables.
The data set contains rich information on product attributes such as volume,
pack size, brand name, producer, and flavor and scent for some products. Take a
milk product as an example. For a product with the UPC “00-01-20742-00303”, from
the data set we know its brand name is “New Square,” produced by the company
“Ahava Food”, and with a volume of 32 oz. We also know it is fat-free skim milk
with Vitamin A&D additives, white color, packaged in a plastic jug and is pasteurized
homogenized. Note that products that are essentially the same but only differ in size
have different UPCs and thus are considered a different product. For instance, a
12-pack Pepsi Coke has a different UPC from a 6-pack Pepsi Coke, and price and
quantity data for them have separate entries.
The household panel in the IRI Academic Data Set has advantages and disad-
vantages comparing to two other well-known consumption data sets: Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) and Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). The PSID and
the CEX collect data on expenditure on food purchase, while the household panel
in the IRI academic data set has prices and quantities, including the exact products
they buy (at the UPC level), the exact stores, and the exact time (up to the exact
week in 2001-2007 and up to the exact minute in 2008–2011). This advantage helps
us better understand the composition in a consumer’s consumption bundles and their
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shopping behavior at finer product categories. An obvious drawback is the household
panel covers just two small MSAs, and the sample is not nationally representative.
Two other retail scanner data sets used in the literature are ACNielsen’s Homes-
can Panel(Aguiar and Hurst (2007), Hausman and Leibtag (2007), Kaplan and Mezio
(2013)) and the TNS Worldpanel for Great Britain (Griffith, Leibtag, Leicester and
Nevo 2009). Only individual purchase records, but not store level data, are available
in these two data sets. One advantage of the ACNielsen’s panel is that it contains
direct information regarding discounts from coupons and sales, while in the IRI aca-
demic data set, temporary price reductions (promotions or sales) are flagged as a
binary variable, which equals one if the temporary price reduction is 5% or greater.
Because regular prices are not available when the product is on sale, discounts from
sales can only be inferred by comparing the reduced price to previous regular prices.
In the household panel such flag variables do not exist. We only observe the actual
price a household pays but not the regular prices or whether a product is on sale or
not.
In this paper, we focus on the the household panel data because our research
interest is consumption smoothing by households. For male household heads, the age
distribution is 10 percent below 45, 25 percent aged 45–54, 21.7 percent aged 55–64,
22 percent over 65, and 21 percent unclassified. In terms of household income, 12.5
percent have income under $20,000; 20.3 percent earn $20,000–$35,000, 27.4 percent
earn $35,000–$55,000, 19.2 percent earn $55,000–$75,000, 12.7 percent have $75,000–
$100,000, and 7.8 percent over $100,000. For education, 35.7 percent of heads have
high school or less education and 18.9 percent have graduated from college or higher.
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As a summary, the sample is older and less educated than a typical sample from the
PSID.
1.3.2 Definition a Good
Kaplan and Menzio (2014) propose four definitions of a good at different levels from
narrowest to broadest: UPC, generic brand aggregation, brand aggregation, and
brand and size aggregation. Throughout the paper, we define a good by its UPC.
Goods within the same product categories but with different UPCs are considered
different goods. For example, an one litre Coca Cola soda is a different good from a
two litres Coca Cola soda. An one litre Coca Cola is a different good from an one
litre Pepsi soda.
1.3.3 Definition of the Average Price
Aguiar and Hurst (2007) define the average price of product as the average price
paid by households for a particular good j (at a UPC level) in a particular time t as
pj,t =
∑
i,t
(
qi,j,t∑
i,t qi,j,t
)
pi,j,t ,
where i denotes a household. The average price of a good is a quantity-weighted
average of individual transactions of the good j in time t, which is a month in a year.
We define the average price of a good as the simple average of prices posted by
all stores in a market m in a week k as
pj,m,k =
1
N
N∑
s=1
pj,s,m,k ,
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where s is a store, and N is the total number of stores in a market. The store-posted
price is defined as weekly sale revenue of good j over the quantity of the product
sold in a store in a week:
pj,s,m,k =
Revj,s,m,k
qj,s,m,k
,
where Rev is the weekly sale revenue from good j.
For our research objective, this definition has several advantages. This measure
gives equal weight to each store and reflect the expected price for a consumer who
walks into a randomly selected store. Second, our definition reduces the measurement
errors of the average prices for goods with few transactions. Even there is only one
transaction of the good in a store in a week, it is the still exact price charged by
the store. Note that a store sales discount apply to all buyers, and discounts from
manufacture coupons do not affect the revenue of a product, even though it does
reduce the final bill for a household, since the retailer gets reimbursement from the
manufacture who is the coupon issuer.
1.3.4 Definition of the Bargain Hunting Index
The bargain hunting index (BHI) is defined as:
BHIi,m,t =
Actual Expi,m,t
Hypo Expi,m,t
− 1 =
∑
j,k Pi,j,m,k ∗Qi,j,m,k∑
j,k Pj,m,k ∗Qi,j,m,k
− 1 ,
where i is a household, m is one of the two cities (Eau Claire, WI or Pittsfield, MA),t
is a quarter or a year, j is a good, and k is a week. For each transaction of a good
by a household in a week, we find the exact prices of the product (identified by its
UPC) in all stores in the city the households resides in the same week. Hypothetical
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expenditure is measured using the average store-posted price (Pmk) of the good in
the same week in the same city, given the consumer’s own consumption bundle.
Expenditure is aggregated over a quarter or a year. A lower BHI means paying less
relative to the store-posted prices given the household’s consumption bundle, which
reflects higher shopping intensity.
1.3.5 Three Types of Consumers
We categorize households into three types: bargain hunters, average consumers and
inattentive shoppers. We first rank the BHI of all households in a city m in a time
period t (a year or a quarter) from low to high. Households in the bottom quartile
are labeled “bargain hunter”, those in the top quartile “inattentive shoppers”, and
the rest “average consumers”.
1.4 Dispersion of Bargain Hunting Index
We start by graphically display the dispersion of BHI for the year 2011 in Figure 1. A
typical distribution of bargain hunting index is right-skewed and leptokurtic. More
than 50% of consumers in each sub-sample pay less than the store-posted prices.
This reflects the fact that a larger share of household heads in the sample are more
than 55, and older individuals are prone to be bargain hunters (Aguiar and Hurst
2005, 2007).
In Figure 1, we split the sample into two, age of household heads over 60 and
under 60, and plot their histograms of bargain hunting index separately. The shape of
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the BHI distribution in each age group is very similar. Two findings are interesting.
First, there is a wide dispersion of BHI within each age group. Among the households
whose heads aging more than 60, some of them shop less intensively and pay 30%
more than others, holding their own consumption bundles. Second, the relative
position of the two histograms explains the well known fact in the literature - older
consumers pay less than younger one. The histogram for older households is close
to a leftward parallel shifting of the histogram for younger households with higher
kurtosis. In other words, an average older consumer pay less than an average younger
consumer. However, an older inattentive shopper pay more than a younger bargain
hunter.
1.5 Change of Bargain Hunting Index over the
Business Cycle
The section examines the effect of income shocks on households’ BHI. Ideally, we
would like to know the response of households to negative shocks such as job loss.
However, certain household characteristics such as employment status are surveyed
only three times (twice in 2007, once in 2012), not in every year. Consequently,
most of the variation in household characteristics is cross-sectional, with limited
intertemporal variation. We use data from the 2007 survey for the 2001–2007 data
and data from the 2012 survey for the 2008–2012 data. We supplement the household
panel data with MSA-level unemployment rates for these two cities as a measure of
city-wide shocks. We use monthly unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS). Quarterly unemployment rates are the mean of three monthly rates
14
in the quarter.
We regress the BHI index on indicators of time available for shopping; namely,
employment status, the unemployment rate in the city (as a proxy for household
head unemployment which is not observed) and year and household fixed effects. The
results, reported in Table 1, are that wealthier households pay more (consistent with
a higher value of time in formal employment), retirees and other non-employed pay
less (although those coefficients are not significant and typical significance levels) and
household pay less relative to the store average, with very high statistical significance,
when unemployment is high.
1.6 Bargain Hunting Index by Product Category
1.6.1 Definition
We now turn to a finer definition of BHI. We ask whether a consumer can be a
bargain hunter for a product category and in the meanwhile an inattentive shopper
for another category. To our knowledge, there is no existing study of the relative
shopping intensity across goods.
Similar to the definition of BHI for total expenditure, the definition of BHI for a
product category is:
BHIi,c,m,t =
Actual Expi,c,m,t
Hypo Expi,c,m,t
− 1 =
∑
j,k Pi,j,m,k ∗Qi,j,m,k∑
j,k Pj,m,k ∗Qi,j,m,k
− 1
where i is a household, c is a product category, j is a good in the product category c,
m is one of the two cities (Eau Claire, WI or Pittsfield, MA),t is a year, k is a week.
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Again, we categorize a household into three types of consumers by the order of
their BHI for a product category from low to high. A household is a bargain hunter
for a category if their BHI lies in the bottom quartile, an inattentive consumer if in
the top quartile, and an average consumer for the rest.
We find there is a wide dispersion of BHI across product categories. A house-
hold is found to be bargain hunters of some categories and inattentive or average
consumers for other categories.
Figure 2 illustrates the average number of product categories for which a house-
hold is a(n) bargain hunter/inattentive shopper over time. To obtain the average
number, we first label the type of consumer for every household and all product
categories in every year. Now each household has the number of categories for which
they are a(n) bargain hunter/average consumer/inattentive consumer. We calculate
the average number for each type across all households in a city in a year. Then we
take the average across the two cities and plot Figure 2.
Over the business cycle, we see households respond to the overall economic condi-
tion by adjusting their overall shopping intensity. During the Great Recession, there
is a clear departure in the pattern from that during the boom year from 2003 to 2007.
On average, households became bargain hunters in more categories and inattentive
shoppers in fewer categories.
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1.6.2 A Model of Shopping Time Allocation over Products
Here we develop a simple model, in the spirit of Becker (1961), to study the allocation
of shopping time over two goods.
The objective function:
max U = αlnC1 + (1− α)lnC2 − µ(T1 + T2) (1.1)
subject to two constraints:
T1 + T2 = T
P1(T1)C1 + P2(T2)C2 = Y
C1 and C2 are the purchased quantities of good 1 and good 2. µ is the opportunity
cost of time. We assume the price of a good is a concave function of shopping time
devoted to the good.
Set up the Lagrangian equation:
αlnC1 + (1− α)lnC2 − µ(T1 + T2) + λ(Y − P1C1 − P2C2)
The first order conditions:
α
1
C1
= λP1 (1.2)
(1− α) 1
C2
= λP2 (1.3)
Divide (2) by (3),
α
1− α
C2
C1
=
P1
P2
(1.4)
The first order conditions for T1 and T2:
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−C1∂P1
∂T1
= −C2∂P2
∂T2
=
µ
λ
(1.5)
At the equilibrium, one extra hour of shopping time spent on good 1 or good 2
should bring the same amount of savings, which is equal to the opportunity cost of
time. Rearrange terms, we have
C2
C1
=
∂P1
∂T1
∂P2
∂P1
α
1− α (1.6)
Combine (4) and (6), we have
∂P1
∂T1
∂P2
∂P1
α
1− α =
P1(T1)
P2(T2)
(1.7)
and then
αP2(T2)
∂P1
∂T1
= (1− α)P1(T1)∂P2
∂T2
(1.8)
Take the partial derivative with respect to α on both sides.
P2
∂P1
∂T1
+ α(P2
∂2P1
∂T 21
− ∂P1
∂T1
∂P2
∂T2
)
∂T1
∂α
= −P2∂P2
∂T2
+ (1− α)(∂P1
∂T1
∂P2
∂T2
− p1∂
2P2
∂T 22
) (1.9)
So the marginal effect of expenditure share of good 1 on the shopping time spent
on good 1:
∂T1
∂α
=
−P1 ∂P2∂T2 − P2 ∂P1∂T1
αP2
∂2P1
∂T 21
+ (1− α)P1 ∂2P2∂T 22 −
∂P1
∂T1
∂P2
∂T2
(1.10)
The numerator on the right hand side is positive. If the denominator is positive,
then the marginal effect of expenditure share on shopping time is positive. In the
data, we do not observe the actual time allocation by households over goods. There-
fore we use BHI for a product category as a proxy for the shopping time, as more
shopping time translates into lower prices and thus lower BHI.
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1.6.3 Evidence
In Table 2, we explore whether consumers obtain better prices for product categories
in which they spend more. We find fairly weak results when consumer fixed effects
are not included. This is reflects that wealthier households are likely to have higher
expenditure across all categories on average, while such household likely choose to
search less for low prices. When we control for household fixed effect, removing
interpersonal comparisons and isolating whether a given household search relatively
more for low prices for goods consumer more, we find that this is so with very high
statistical significance.
1.7 Results
1.7.1 Cyclicality of the Effective Inflation Rate
To assess the cyclicality of the effective inflation rate, relative to the overall inflation
rate, as a function of the local unemployment rate, we replicate the baseline regression
of CGH (2015) using household level scanner data instead of store level data, which
they use. We estimate the regression equation
pimct = βURmt + θc + year dummies + error ,
where m indexes markets (Eau Claire or Pittsfield), c indexes the product category
(e.g., beer, coffee) and t stands for month, respectively. pimct is the effective inflate
rate in city m for product c in period t, URmt is the local monthly unemployment
rate, and θc denotes category fixed effects. Prices are deflated by monthly CPIs
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prior to construction of the effective inflation rate. The dependent variable is the
effective inflation rate net of inflation based on changes in CPI. For example, if the
inflation measured by changes in CPI is 5% and inflation measured by changes in
actual prices consumers pay is 3%, then the effective inflation rate is –2%. Details
of computing category level effective inflation are in the footnotes of Table 1. The
null hypothesis is that the response of the effective inflation rate to a change in
local unemployment is the same as that of the regular inflation rate as measured
by changes in CPI; i.e. β = 0. The estimate of β in Table 1 shows that a 1%
increase in the local unemployment rate is associated with a 0.28% reduction in the
effective inflation rate relative to the regular inflation based on changes in the CPI.
The estimate is close to the estimate of 0.25% found in CGH (2015). It implies that
consumers are able to substitute for less expensive brands, or find better prices on
identical brands, more often during spells of unemployment. The effect is minor,
partly because the coefficient is likely biased towards zero if interpreted as the effect
of individual-level unemployment, which varies significantly more than the regional
average, so the effect may well be important for many unemployed individuals.1
1.7.2 Consumer Savings
To measure an upper bound of consumer savings for each UPC in a given month,
we use the highest price paid in a market as the benchmark price and calculate the
hypothetical expenditure for each household given that household’s consumption
1We will attempt to correct for this bias in the future.
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bundle. The hypothetical expenditure is calculated as
∑
j
p¯jtqijt ,
where qijt is household i’s consumption of good j in month t, and p¯jt is the highest
price, across all consumers, paid for this product in a month. The hypothetical
expenditure measures how much a household would pay for its consumption bundle
if it paid the highest price. The “savings” index, indeximt,
indeximt = 100
(∑
j pijtqijt∑
j p¯jtqijt
− 1
)
%
measures how much a household has “saved” with its actual expenditure relative to
the hypothetical expenditure. To test the cyclicality of saving, we use the following
specification:
indeximt = βURmt + γXimt + year dummies + θi + error,
where i indexes a household and the dependent variable is the relative saving index,
measured by percentage deviation of actual expenditure from hypothetical expendi-
ture. a lower value of indeximt measures greater relative savings by that household.
Ximt is a set of household characteristics including the head’s age, education, family
size, and combined household income. The results, shown in Table 2, imply that
when the local unemployment rate increases by 1%, the distance of household ac-
tual expenditure from the expenditure on the same basket of goods evaluated at the
highest prices increases by 1.26%.
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1.7.2.1 Alternative Specification
To better illustrate the idea of savings relative to hypothetical expenditures, we use
the following specification:
log expenseimt = β1URmt + β2 log expenseimt + γXimt + year dummies + θi + error.
The dependent variable is a household’s actual expenditure. On the right hand side,
log expenseimt is the hypothetical expenditure at highest prices given a household’s
consumption bundle. This specification is very similar to that of the previous specifi-
cation, but has an easier interpretation: holding hypothetical expenditure constant,
when the local unemployment rate increases, does a household spend less on its con-
sumption bundle? The results are reported in Table 3. With an 1% increase in the
local unemployment rate, holding hypothetical expenditure constant, a household’s
actual expenditure decreases by 2.7%; i.e., they save more relative to hypothetical
expenditure.
1.7.2.2 Number of Stores Visited and Number of Shopping Trips
So far we have not attempted to identify the channels through which consumers save.
Griffith, Leibtag, Leicester and Nevo (2009) summarize four channels: purchasing on
sale, buying in bulk (at lower per unit prices), buying generic brands, and choosing
outlets. We are able to explore the channel of purchasing on sale and choosing
outlets. If, in a recession, consumers spend more time looking for deals and/or
switch to cheaper outlets, then they would take more trips to stores but visit less
stores because they are less likely to visit expensive outlets. To test the cyclicality
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of the number of stores visited, we use the following specification:
logNstoresimt = βURmt + γXimt + year dummies + θi + error,
where the dependent variable Nimt is the number of stores visited by household i
in month t. Results are shown in Table 4. The results imply that when the local
unemployment rate increases by 1%, the number of stores visited increases by 1.25%.
To calculate the number of shopping trips, we need the exact time the customer
checks out. A transaction with products checked out at a given time (measured to
the minute) is counted as one trip. The exact minute of transactions are only avail-
able from 2008 to 2011. As noted in the data description section, because households
are surveyed only once during this period, there is no time variation of household
characteristics over time and they will be absorbed into the household fixed effects.
We estimate the following specification for 2008–2011:
logNtripsimt = βURmt + year dummies + θi + error,
The results are shown in Table 5 and imply that a 1% increase in the local unem-
ployment rate is associated with 3.27% more shopping trips.
In Table 3, we return to interpersonal comparisons and the main focus is on the
second column in which category*year fixed effects are included. Some categories
of goods tend to have many sales and whoever consumes a lot of that good may
fairly randomly appear to be a high-intensity searcher. Such a pattern is consistent
with the first column, which does not control for category*year effects, and the more
interesting results are in the second column which does control for category*year
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effects. This column revels significant differences between households; in particular,
households which consume relatively more of a category search more for low prices
and old household search more. Retirement is also significant, with more search, even
after controlling for age, and unemployment is significant with a very large t-value
over 60.
1.8 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the heterogeneity in consumers’ shopping behavior. First,
there is considerable amount of heterogeneity in search intensity for lower prices by
households across and within every age group. On average, older consumers pay
less for their consumption bundle than younger consumers. However, inattentive
shoppers pay 30% more than bargain hunters within the same age group.Second,
consumers search harder in a recession. An 1% increase in the local unemployment
rate increases the search intensity by 0.25%. Household receiving different levels of
income shocks display varying search intensity. Third, we categorize consumers into
three types by the order of search intensity: bargain hunters, average consumers and
inattentive shoppers. We then examine shopping behavior at the product category
level. An interesting finding is that the consumer types do not persist over the
business cycle. During the Great Recession, on average consumers became bargain
hunters of more product categories and inattentive shoppers of fewer categories.
Lastly, we write a simple model to study the shopping time allocation, an extension
of home production models. We find that consumers more likely to be a bargain
bargain hunter and less likely to be an inattentive shopper for a product category on
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which they spend more.
It would be interesting to examine heterogeneity in consumers’ shopping behavior
at an even finer level, i.e. at the UPC level. Do consumers rationalize their shopping
time over goods within the same category? For example, if a consumer is a bargain
hunter of carbonated beverage, is it possible she is a bargain hunter of Pepsi but an
inattentive shopper of Coca Cola, a bargain hunter of 2 litre coke and inattentive
shopper of 1 litre coke? There is need for more research in this field.
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Table 1.1: Product Categories
Beer Household Cleaner Salt Snack
Blades Hot Dog Shampoo
Carbonated Beverages Laundry Detergent Soup
Cigarettes Margarine/Butter Spaghetti Sauce
Coffee Mayo Toilet Tissue
Cold Cereals Milk Tooth Brush
Deodorant Mustard/Ketchup Tooth Paste
Diapers Paper Towel Yogurt
Facial Tissue Peanut Butter
Frozen Dinner Photo
Frozen Pizza Razors
Notes: There are a few product categories that have relatively very few observations, so that we do not include
them in any of the regressions. These categories are blades, cigarettes, hot dog, photo, razors, and soup.
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Table 1.2: IRI Markets
Atlanta Knoxville Richmond/Norfok
Birmingham/Montgomery Los Angeles Roanoke
Buffalo/Rochester Milwaukee Sacramento
Charlotte Minneapolis/St Paul Salt Lake City
Chicago MIssissippi San Diego
Cleveland New England San Francisco
Dallas, TX New Orleans, LA Seattle/Tacoma
Des Moines New York City South Carolina
Detroit Oklahoma City Spokane
Eau Claire Omaha St. Louis
Grand Rapids Peoria/Springfield Syracuse
Green Bay Philadelphia Toledo
Harrisburg/Scrant Phoenix, AZ Tulsa, OK
Hartford Pittsfield Washington, DC
Houston Portland, OR West Texas/New Mexico
Indianapolis Providnce, RI
Kansas City Raleigh/Durham
Notes: There are 50 IRI markets included. Pittsfield and Eau Claire are the only two BehaviorScan markets
with household panel data. Other 48 standard markets have store level data only. Monthly seasonally-adjusted
unemployment rates data are from Bureau of Labor Statistics. If the IRI market is two metropolitan areas
combined, we use the average of the two unemployment rates for this market. If the IRI market is a state, we use
the state level unemployment rate. In the special case of the IRI market “West Texas/New Mexico”, we just use
unemployment rate of New Mexico.
27
Figure 1.1: Dynamics of Weekly Price of 12 oz Classic Coca Cola in a Grocery
Store in Eau Claire, WI
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Figure 1.2: Average Price vs Best Price of 12 oz Classic Cola Cola across Stores
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Figure 1.3: Histograms of Bargain Hunting Index for Households in Two
Demographic Groups
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Figure 1.4: Average Number of Product Categories Where A Household Is A
Bargain Hunter/Inattentive Consumer
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Table 1.3: Effects of Income Shocks on Bargain Hunting Index
Dependent Variable Bargain Hunting Index Bargain Hunting Index
Income 0.025 0.026
( 2.01) (2.10)
Age -0.011 -0.010
(-1.78) (-1.67)
Non-employed -0.108 1.500
(-1.10) (3.74)
Retired -0.092 -0.387
(-1.21) (-1.96)
Unemployment Rate -0.276 -0.255
(-9.89) (-8.49)
Non-employed * UnRate -0.355
(-4.14)
Retired * UnRate 0.058
(1.62)
Year Fixed Effect YES YES
Household Fixed Effect YES YES
Number of Observations 87098 87098
Note: The results are from the panel regression
BHIndexi,m,t = αi + ηt +Xi,m,tβ + Um,tθ +Xi,m,tUm,tγ + εi,m,t
in which i is a household, m is one of the two cities, Pittsfield MA or Eau Claire WI, t is a quarter. αi is the household
fixed effect and ηt is the time fixed effect The bargain hunting index is in percentage. Income is in ten thousands.
“Retired” and “Non-employed” are dummy variables, “1” indicating “yes” and “0” indicating “no”. Enclosed in the
parenthesis are the t-statistics
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Table 1.4: Effect of Expenditure on a Product Category and Likelihood of Being a
Bargain Hunter for the Category
Dependent Variable Bargain Hunter Bargain Hunter
Log Expenditure 0.0924 0.1863
( 7.80) (13.44)
UnRate * Expenditure 0.0191 -0.0013
(8.97) (-0.51)
Retired * Expenditure -0.0096 -0.0091
(-1.50) (-1.40)
Non-employed * Expenditure -0.0073 -0.0150
(-0.93) (-1.90)
Income 0.0006 -0.0018
(0.86) (2.32)
Age 0.0049 0.0038
(19.97) (14.89)
Non-employed -0.0217 0.0547
(-0.67) (1.67)
Retired 0.0093 0.0446
(0.37) (1.74)
UnRate -0.0103 -0.9232
(-1.30) (-58.79)
Category*Year Fixed Effect No YES
Number of Observations 719563 715214
Note: The results are from the logit regression
BargainHunteri,m,c,t = αc ∗ ηt + log(exp)i,m,c,tβ+ log(exp)i,m,c,tUm,tγ+ log(exp)i,m,c,tXi,m,tδ+Xi,m,tφ +Um,tθ+ εi,m,c,t
in which i is a household, m is one of the two cities, Pittsfield MA or Eau Claire WI, c is a product category, t is
a year, and X is a vector of demographic variables. αc is the category fixed effect and ηt is the time fixed effect.
”Bargain Hunter” is a binary variable taking on value “1” if the household is a bargain hunter for that category in the
year, and value “0” if not a bargain hunter. Income is in ten thousands. ”Retired” and ”Non-employed” are dummy
variables, “1” indicating “yes” and “0” indicating “no”. Enclosed in the parenthesis are the z-statistics.
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Table 1.5: Effect of Expenditure on a Product Category and Likelihood of Being an
Inattentive Consumer for the Category
Dependent Variable Inattentive Consumer Inattentive Consumer
Log Expenditure -0.0031 -0.1327
( -0.27) (-9.55)
UnRate * Expenditure -0.0242 -0.0027
(-11.34) (-1.08)
Retired * Expenditure 0.0082 0.0106
(1.28) (1.63)
Non-employed * Expenditure 0.0027 0.0146
(0.35) (1.84)
Income -0.000 -0.0014
(-0.12) (-1.87)
Age -0.0047 -0.0038
(-19.11) (-14.74)
Non-employed 0.0327 -0.0549
(1.01) (-1.66)
Retired -0.0023 -0.0527
(-0.09) (-2.04)
UnRate 0.0407 0.9571
(5.12) (60.31)
Category*Year Fixed Effect No YES
Number of Observations 719563 715214
Note: The results are from the logit regression
InattentiveConsumeri,m,c,t = αc∗ηt+log(exp)i,m,c,tβ+log(exp)i,m,c,tUm,tγ+log(exp)i,m,c,tXi,m,tδ+Xi,m,tφ+Um,tθ+εi,m,c,t
in which i is a household, m is one of the two cities, Pittsfield MA or Eau Claire WI, c is a product
category, t is a year, and X is a vector of demographic variables. αc is the category fixed effect and
ηt is the time fixed effect. “Inattentive Consumer” is a binary variable taking on value “1” if the
household is an inattentive consumer for that category in the year, and value “0” if not an inattentive
consumer. Income is in ten thousands. “Retired” and “Non-employed” are dummy variables, “1”
indicating “yes” and “0” indicating “no”. Enclosed in the parenthesis are the z-statistics.
34
Table 1.6: Relative Prices as a Function of Unemployment
Dependent Variable Effective Inflation Rate
Unemp Rate
–0.28
[0.099]**
Observations 3833
categories 31
Category Fix Eff Yes
Year Dummies Yes
Std Errors Unclustered
Note: The table reports estimates of the specification pimct = β URmt + λt + θc + error. The sample
period is 2001–2011. The dependent variable is the effective inflation rate for a category in a market
in a month. First we calculate log pjmt − log pjmt−1, where j indexes a UPC level product, as the
effective inflation rate for each product within a category. Then the effective inflation of a category
is the simple average of effective inflation of all products within the category. The prices are deflated
by monthly CPI. Thus, the dependent variable is effective inflation based on changes of real prices.
Standard errors are in brackets. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Table 1.7: Relative Savings as a Function of Unemployment
Dependent Variable Consumer Savings
Unemp Rate
–1.259
[0.058]***
Family Size
–0.621
[0.103]***
Observations 218348
Households 1673
Household Fix Eff Yes
Year Dummies Yes
Std Errors Unclustered
Note: The table reports estimates of the specification indeximt = βURmt + γXimt + year dummies + θi + error,.
The sample period is 2001–2011.The dependent variable is percentage deviation of actual monthly expenditure from
hypothetical monthly expenditure at highest prices for all UPCs the households buy. Ximt is a set of household
characteristics including the household head’s age, education, family size, and combined household income, all of
which except family size are categorical variables. For brevity, we only report the coefficient for family size in the
table. Standard errors are in brackets. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels
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Table 1.8: Expenses as a Function of Unemployment
Dependent Variable Actual Expense
Unemp Rate
–0.027
[0.001]***
Expense at highest price
0.661
[0.001]***
Family Size
–0.014
[0.002]**
Observations 218349
Households 1673
Household Fix Eff Yes
Year Dummies Yes
Std Errors Unclustered
Note: The table reports estimates of the specification logExpenseimt = β1URmt + β2 log ¯Expensemt + γXimt +
year effects + θi + error. The sample period is 2001–2011. The dependent variable is a household’s actual monthly
expenditure. Hypothetical monthly expenditure at the highest prices household pay for all UPCs bought log ¯Expense
is controlled for on the right hand side. The coefficient in interest is β1, which measures how much the household
saves when the local unemployment rate increases by 1%, holding hypothetical expenditure constant. Ximt is a set of
household characteristics including the household head’s age, education, family size, and combined household income,
all of which except family size are categorical variables. To compress space we only report the coefficient for family
size in the table.Standard errors are in brackets. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%,5%, and 10% levels
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Table 1.9: Number of Stores Visited as a Function of Unemployment
Dependent Variable Number of Stores
Unemp Rate
–0.0125
[0.0012]***
Family Size
0.0087
[0.0021]***
Observations 218349
Households 1673
Household Fix Eff Yes
Year Dummies Yes
Std Errors Unclustered
Note: The table reports estimates of the specification logNstoresimt = βURmt + γXimt + year dummies + θi + error.
The sample period is 2001–2011. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of stores a household
visits in a month. Ximt is a set of household characteristics including the household head’s age, education, family size,
and combined household income, all of which except family size are categorical variables. For brevity, we only report
the coefficient for family size in the table. Standard errors are in brackets. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%,5%, and
10% levels
Table 1.10: Number of Shopping Trips as a Function of Unemployment
Dependent Variable Number of Trips
Unemp Rate
0.0327
[0.0022]***
Observations 79618
Households 1673
Household Fix Eff Yes
Year Dummies Yes
Std Errors Unclustered
Note: The table reports estimates of the specification logNtripsimt = βURmt + year dummies + θi + error. The
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of shopping trips a household makes in a month, from 2008
to 2011. Since households are surveyed only once during this period, household characteristics are absorbed into the
household fixed effects. Standard errors are in brackets. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels
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Table 1.11: Heterogeneity in Income and Effects on Relative Savings
Dependent Variable Consumer Savings Dependent Variable Consumer Savings
Unemp Rate –1.101 Edu1 –0.775
[0.080]*** [0.265]***
UR× Incq2 –0.173 Edu2 –2.692
[0.083]** [1.202]**
UR× Incq3 –0.235 Edu3 3.193
[0.121]** [0.693]***
UR× Incq4 –0.004 Edu4 –2.529
[0.098] [0.487]***
UR× Incq5 —0.254 Edu5 -2.836
[0.093]*** [0.413]***
Incq2 1.191 Edu6 –2.931
[0.517]*** [0.406]***
Incq3 1.380 Edu7 –3.123
[0.702]*** [0.354]***
Incq4 0.175 Edu8 –0.687
[0.618]*** [0.421]***
Incq5 0.916 Family Size –0.637
[0.625]*** [0.102]***
MaleAge1 8.820 Observations 214604
[4.210]** Households 1672
MaleAge2 4.677 Household Fix Eff No
[3.705] Year Dummies Yes
MaleAge3 8.406 Std Errors Unclustered
[3.597]**
MaleAge4 8.921
[3.586]**
MaleAge5 8.420
[3.585]**
MaleAge6 7.982
[3.585]**
Notes: The table reports estimates of the specification indeximt = β URmt +
∑
γkURmt × inck +
λt + θXit + error. The sample period is 2001–2011.The dependent variable is percentage deviation
of actual monthly expenditure from hypothetical monthly expenditure at highest prices for all UPCs
the households buy. Xit is a set of household characteristics including the male house head’s age,
education, occupation, family size, and combined household income, all of which except family size
are categorical variables. Definition of dummy variables: (1) incq1=1 if income is within [0, $24,999];
incq2=1 if [$25,000, $44,999]; incq3=1 if [$45,000,$54,999]; incq4=1 if [$55,000,$74,999]; incq5=1 if
greater than $75,000. Cumulative shares for each of these approximate quintiles are 19.76, 47.60,
60.33, 79.54, 100 respectively. (2) MaleAge1=1 if age is within [18,24]; MaleAge2=1 if [25,34];
MaleAge3=1 if [35,44]; MaleAge4=1 if [45,54]; MaleAge5=1 if [55,64]; MaleAge6=1 if greater than
65; MaleAge7=1 if “no such person”. ***,**,* denote significance at 1%,5%, and 10% levels
Chapter 2
Channels of Wage Income
Smoothing: United States
1963-2010
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2.1 Introduction
Wage income is the largest component of total compensation in all major advanced
economies. In the Great Recession and the following recovery in the United States,
total wage income moves together with Gross Domestic Product (GDP), with varia-
tion across states. What is the degree of wage income smoothing at the state level?
What are the channels through which wage income smoothing is achieved, and their
respective contribution? Is the wage income smoothing symmetric across recessions
and expansions? To shed light on these issues, I study the patterns of wage in-
come smoothing among U.S. states during the period 1963-2010. There are three
channels that wage income smoothing can occur in a federal regime and a single
market for labor: net taxes, employers, and interstate commuting. First, federal and
local governments can reduce their shares of Gross Domestic Products by reducing
taxes imposed on firms, and thus boosting the share of total compensation for labor
and capital. Second, through labor contracts, employers can maintain the level of
wage income across business cycle. Third, in a single market for labor, workers can
commute to work in other states that have better job prospects.
Following the framework in Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha (1996), I quantify the
amount of state-level wage income smoothing at each of these levels of smoothing in
the United States. This methodology gives a decomposition of a the cross-sectional
variance in gross state product and yields the following identity:
1 = βT + βE + βC + βU ,
where βT , βE, βC are the fractions of shocks to gross state product smoothed by net
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taxes, employers, and interstate commuting income, and βU is the fraction of shocks
that are not smoothed. My main objective is to estimate the components of this
relationship. For the period 1963-2010, I find that 1.8 percent of shocks to gross
state product are smoothed by net taxes on production, 55.1 percent are smoothed
by employers, and 3 percent are smoothed by interstate commuting income. The
remaining 40.1 percent are not smoothed.
I also decompose βU , the fraction that is not smoothed, into two subcategories:
number of employment and average earnings per employment, both of which are pro-
cyclical to shocks to gross state product, but average earning per employment is more
insulated from shocks than the total compensation from employment. Employers
can lay off workers but maintain the pay level for those who keep the job. Put in a
different way, unemployment is a shock absorber that smooths the average earnings
per employment. I find that unemployment smooths 22.3 percent of shocks to total
compensation.
Next, I study how wage income smoothing vary across four non-overlapping time
periods, 1963-1973, 1974-1983, 1984-2003, 2004-2010. What stands out is the decade
1974-1983, for which employers smoothed the least fraction of shocks and largest
fraction of shocks were passed through to labor compensation in the four sub-periods.
Lastly, I study the speed of adjustment of wage income to economic expansions
and recessions. The asymmetrical pattern of adjustment is termed ”rockets and
feathers”, referring to the fact that prices of downstream products respond faster
and more strongly to positive shocks to upstream prices than negative ones. I test
whether the adjust of wage income exhibit such a feature.
41
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is the literature re-
view. Section 3 is a theoretical framework of risk-sharing contracts with and without
worker’s mobility. Section 4 is definition of variables and the variance decomposition
framework. Results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 is the conclusion.
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2.2 Literature Review
My work is related to four strands of literature. The first is on risk-sharing of personal
income and consumption over the business cycle. The second is on real wage rigidity
over the business cycle. The third is risk-sharing implicit contract models. The
fourth is regional labor market adjustment to shocks. In this section I will briefly
discuss representative papers in each strand and my contribution to the literature.
Asdrubali, Sorensen and Yosha (1996)(hereafter ASY 1996) develop a framework
for quantifying the amount of risk sharing among states of the U.S. and decompose
it into several contributing channels. Following this framework, several papers study
the extent of regional risk sharing in different countries and suggest new channels of
income and consumption smoothing.
Borge and Matsen (2004) analyze public employment as a risk sharing channel
in Norway over the period 1977-1990. They find it smooths up to 25% private sector
output shocks. Demyanyk, Ostergaard, and Sorensen (2007) investigate how bank
lending to small businesses smooths state-level personal income. Juessen (2008) fo-
cuses commuting as a risk-sharing channel for consumption at state-level. Hoffmann
and Shcherbakova (2011) look into the business cycle angle of consumption risk shar-
ing and find it is pro-cyclical. These papers estimate the extent of risk sharing for
personal income and consumption, but they do not decompose it to separate com-
ponents of personal income. In my knowledge, there is no study on risk sharing of
wage income, the largest component of personal income in most advanced economies.
This paper tries to fill this gap in the literature.
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The study of real wage over the business cycle can date back at least to Keynes
(1936), in which he wrote “...in general, an increase in employment can only occur to
the accompaniment of a decline in the rate of real wages.” Abraham and Haltiwanger
(1995) provide an excellent review of this literature on early evidence of cyclicality of
real wages. On one hand, real wages being countercyclical, as conjectured by Keynes,
is consistent with theories of sticky nominal wages and sticky expectations. On the
other hand, real wage procyclicality is also consistent with alternative workhorse
macroeconomic theories such as real business cycle models. In the early papers
(Bodkin 1969, Otani 1978, Chirinko 1980, and Sumner and Silver 1989 ), in typical
regressions, levels or growth rates of annual aggregate hourly earnings are regressed
against annual unemployment rate to study the real wage behavior over the business
cycle. Findings are mixed. Results are sensitive to a number of measurement choices:
(1)how to construct the real wage; (2) how to measure the cyclical indicator; (3) how
to detrend data; (4)the frequency and sample period of data; (5)how to control for
industry composition over time; (6)how to control for workforce composition over
the cycle. Over the last two decades, with access to micro panel data in the United
States to overcome the issues listed above, many studies (see Shin 1994; Solon,
Barsky and Parker 1994 and Devereax 2001) come to the consensus that real wages
are procyclical. Unlike these researches using either national aggregate data or micro
panel data, my work is based on state level data, which allows for more cross-sectional
variation, comparing to nationally aggregate data, and decomposition of smoothing
of wage income at the state level into several “macro” channels.
The literature of risk-sharing contract models dates back to Azariadis (1975) and
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Bailey (1974). They show that in an economy of risk-neutral firms and risk-averse
workers, a binding insurance labor contract is a welfare improvement, and under such
a contract, real earnings are invariant to idiosyncratic shocks. Harris and Holmstrom
(1982) and Thomas and Worrall (1988) extend their models to allow for the contract
non-binding to either party. Beaudry and DiNardo (1991)develop nested models
linking wages to labor market conditions to test the relative importance of spot
market and implicit contracts in determining real wages. I use a simplified version
of their models as the theoretical underpinning of empirical analysis in this paper.
Blanchard and Katz (1992) establish stylized facts about how states in the U.S.
respond to regional shocks in terms of adjustment in unemployment, participation
and interstate migration in the post-war period up to 1990. They conclude that in-
terstate migration plays the most important role for adjustments to regional shocks,
more so than regional relative wages or firm reallocation. A recent paper by Dao,
Furceri and Loungani (2014) provide updated facts on regional labor market ad-
justments. Among other findings, the extent of absorbing regional shocks by labor
participation rates increases over time. This paper continues this vein of research
and provide new facts of firms adjusting employment versus wages to regional shocks.
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2.3 Theoretical Framework of Risk-Sharing Con-
tract
I present in this section a risk-sharing contract framework, a simplified version of
Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), to account for the real wage rigidity in the business
cycle. There are three nested wage-setting models: a spot market, in which wage
is determined by each period’s productivity shock ; a full-commitment risk-sharing
model, in which the wage for a worker is determined by the productivity shock at
the time when the worker was hired; and a full mobility implicit contract model, in
which the wage for a worker is determined by the highest productivity shock since
employment began.
If all employment is signed in a spot market, according to a neo-classical model
where output is determined by a Cobb-Douglas production function, wage income is
a fixed portion of aggregate products and thus always moves one-for-one with GDP.
In the remaining of this section I will focus on the case when wage is not determined
in the spot market.
Consider an economy populated with risk-neutral entrepreneurs and risk-averse
workers. The economy produces only one good, and the worker’s utility per period
associated with the consumption of c units of the good is given by U(c). Both
types of agents have a discount factor equal to β. Also assume the labor market is
competitive. Each of the entrepreneurs is assumed to have access to a technology
that requires one worker. The working hours are fixed throughout the employment.
Therefore labor income is in fixed proportion to wage. The quantity of output from
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this technology is given by Φ(t), where Φ(t) represents the state of labor productivity
at time t. Assume that the stochastic process of labor productivity is represented in
the AR(1) process:
Φ(t) = (1− α)Φ∗ + αΦ(t− 1) + (t), 0 < α ≤ 1, (t)isi.i.d, (2.1)
where Φ∗ is the long-term level.
When workers do not have access to capital markets, entrepreneurs have incen-
tives to offer employment contracts that protect workers against the risks associated
with productivity shocks. Obviously, competition will force such contracts to offer
zero expected profits to employers. If both firms and workers can commit to the
contract, then in every period the market equilibrium for risk-sharing employment
contracts will be the solution to the following program:
max{ωt+j}
∞∑
i=0
βjEt [U(ωt+j)]
s.t.
∞∑
i=0
βjEt [Φt+j − ωt+j] = 0.
The solution to this problem is simply that the wage paid at time t + j in a
contract negotiated at time t is:
ω(t+ j, t) = Φ∗ +
1− β
1− αβ [Φ(t)− Φ
∗] (2.2)
The wage throughout the employment depends only on the productivity level at
time t and is independent of j. Its implications are twofold. First, wage responds to
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current technology shock only and more than one-for-one. Second, once a contract
is signed, wage does not respond to future productivity shocks or total income.
Given this process for the contractual wages, employment will adjust such that
the marginal worker will be indifferent between accepting a job today and staying
unemployed this period and postponing until next period the decision to take a
job. When workers are unemployed, they are assumed to receive a reservation wage
denoted ω¯, which could be from social insurance and/or home production. The
reservation wage can be agent-specific. The equilibrium condition related to this
indifference relationship is given by:
U(ω¯) + βE
[V (ω(t+ 1, t+ 1),Φ(t+ 1))
Φ(t)
]
= V (ω(t, t),Φ(t)). (2.3)
The expression V (ω,Φ(t)) represents the discounted expected utility associated
with having a job with the contract wage equal to ω when the state of technology is
Φ(t).
Equation (3) states that the expected discounted value of staying unemployed
today, receiving ω¯ and accepting a job tomorrow must be equal to the value of
accepting a job today.
use equations (1)-(3) to solve for equilibrium relationship between the contract
wage and the reservation wage. Assume a logarithm utility function, we can derive
for the relationship:
log[ω(t+ j, t)] =
1
1− β [β(1− α)log(Φ
∗) + βRp] +
1− β
1− αβ log[ωh(t)] (2.4)
where Rp is the residual representing second-order and higher terms. It is always
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negative because U(.) is concave and assumed constant.
Equation (4) states that the time (t+ j)-period wage paid to worker who began
his job at time t depends positively on the reservation wage of the marginal worker
employed at time t. Given the general equilibrium nature of the problem, this reser-
vation wage represents the marginal value of household production and therefore
should be negatively related to the fraction of workers remaining in that sector.
Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that the reservation wage of the marginal
worker changes with the participation rate, l(t)/L(t), as given by:
ln[ωh(t)]− ln[ωH(t− 1)] = (1− θ)[l(t)− l(t− 1)]
L(t)
, 0 < θ < 1 (2.5)
Substituting equation (5) into equation (4) results in
log[ω(t+ j, t)] = Ω1 + Ω2
[
1− l(t)
L(t)
]
, (2.6)
where
Ω1 =
1
1− β [β(1− α)log(Φ
∗) + βRp]
Ω2 =
−(1− θ)(1− β)
1− αβ < 0
. The implication of equation (6) is that when there is a positive productivity shock
to the economy, workers entering employment sign new long-term contracts that
reflect their current marginal product. However this shock does not affect wages
of workers who entered in previous periods. Therefore the sensitivity of total labor
income to productivity shocks is less than one.
Extension to Risk-sharing Contracts with Mobile Workers
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One of the assumptions used to derive equation (6) is that workers can commit not
to quit a job even though employment contracts offered on the market may be better
than the one at hand. We shall call such a situation the case of limited labor mobility.
However, when job mobility is costless for workers, the only feasible contracts to
which they can commit themselves are those in which it is never profitable for another
employer to bid them away. Therefore, contracts must render non-positive expected
profits for the employer in every period and in every state (otherwise the workers will
be bid away). The conditions imposed on a contract in order to satisfy the absence
of ”bidding-away” opportunities are given by the following inequalities:
E
[ ∞∑
i=j
βi−j[Φt+i −Wt+i(Φti)|Φt+j]
] ≤ 0 (2.7)
for all j = 1, ...∞ and all realizations of Φt+j.
In the inequality (7), the wage Wt+j(Φ
t+j) represents the wage paid in period t + j
after a history of productivity shocks Φt+j = (Φt,Φt+1, ...,Φt+j) and for a job that
began at time t.
Harris and Holmstrom (1982) give a solution to a problem very close the one
above, only with the difference that the time horizon is finite in their paper. The
optimal zero-profit risk-sharing contract satisfying the non-bidding-away constraints
is given by:
Wt+j(Φ
t+j) = max{Wt+j−1, X(Φt+j)} = max{X(Φt+i)}ji=1 (2.8)
The functionX(Φt+i) represents the initial wage paid in a contract negotiated in state
Φt+i and is equal to the average expected productivity conditional on {Φt+i, ...|Φt
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being below Φt since any realizations of Φt must give zero expected profits. The wage
contract defined by equation (8) is often referred to as a downwardly rigid contract.
Under such a contract, a worker’s wage is adjusted to match the contemporaneously
negotiated first-period wage X(Φt+j), whenever the latter is above the former. This
adjustment is undertaken so that workers do not quit because of higher wages offered
elsewhere.
I now move on to model the relation between predicted wage with observed labor
market conditions. As in the case of no mobility, it is assumed that the reservation
wage is negatively related to the unemployment rate, the market equilibrium is:
Wt+j(Φ
t+j) = W (t+ j, t) = max
{
k
[
1− l(t+ i)
L(t+ i)
]}j
i=0
, k
′
(.) < 0, (2.9)
where k(.) is a function of unemployment rate.
The implications of equation (8) and (9) are twofold. First, as worker’s mobil-
ity increases over time, the wage income would be more responsive to productivity
shocks. Second, asymmetric responses to positive and negative shocks are allowed.
Wages increase when shocks are positive while stay the same for negative shocks.
In the later sections I will test the implications from the three nested models.
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2.4 Decomposition of Variance in Gross State Prod-
uct
Here is the identity linking up gross state product and wage income:
GSPi =
GSPi
GSPi −NTi
GSPi −NTi
WagePWi
WagePWi
WageRi
WageRi (2.10)
The variables in the equation are described below.
Gross state product (GSP ). Using the income method, GSP is the sum of
compensation of employees, net taxes on production and imports and gross operating
surplus.
Gross operating surplus. Defined as the income derived from production by
incorporated enterprises that is earned by the capital factor.
Net taxes (NT ). Defined as taxes on production and import minus subsidies.
Roughly speaking, compensation of employees is labor’s share of a state’s output,
gross operating surplus is capital’s share, and net taxes is the government’s share.
Wages and salaries are broadly defined to include commissions, tips, and bonuses;
voluntary employee contributions to deferred compensation plans, such as 401(k)
plans; employee gains from exercising stock options; and receipts-in-kind that repre-
sent income. Wage and salary disbursements are measured before deductions, such
as social security contributions, union dues, and voluntary employee contributions
to defined contribution pension plans. The difference between Wage and salary dis-
bursement by place of work (WagePW ) is the interstate commuting income.
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Taking logs and differences of Equation (10), multiplying both sides by ∆ log(GSPi),
we obtain the following decomposition of the cross-sectional variance in GSP:
var{∆ log(GSP )} =cov{∆ log(GSP ), ∆ log(GSP )−∆ log(GSP −NT )}
+cov{∆ log(GSP ), ∆ log(GSP −NT )−∆ log(WagePW )}
+cov{∆ log(GSP ), ∆ log(WagePW )−∆ log(WageR)}
+cov{∆ log(GSP ), ∆ log(WageR)}
(2.11)
Divided by the variance of ∆ log(GSP ) to get:
1 = βT + βE + βC + βU (2.12)
where βT is the OLS estimate of the slope in the regression of ∆ log(GSP ) −
∆ log(GSP−NT ) on ∆ log(GSP ) , βE is the OLS estimate of the slope in the regres-
sion of ∆ log(GSP−NT )−∆ log(WagePW ) on ∆ log(GSP ), βC is the OLS estimate
of the slope in the regression of ∆ log(WagePW )−∆ log(WageR) on ∆ log(GSP ), βT
is the OLS estimate of the slope in the regression of ∆ log(WageR) on ∆ log(GSP ).
Actual regressions to estimate the four coefficients are:
∆ log(GSPi,t)−∆ log(GSPi,t −NTi,t)i,t =µi + νT,t + βT∆ log(GSPi,t) + εi,T,t
∆ log(GSPi,t −NTi,t)−∆ log(WagePWi,t) =µi + νE,t + βE∆ log(GSPi,t) + εi,E,t
∆ log(WagePWi,t)−∆ log(WageRi,t) =µi + νC,t + βC∆ log(GSPi,t) + εi,C,t
∆ log(WageRi,t) =µi + νU,t + βU∆ log(GSPi,t) + εi,U,t
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where ∆ log(GSPi,t) is the idiosyncratic growth rate of a state in a year, defined as
∆ log(GSPi,t) = ∆ log(GSPi,t)−∆ log(GSPi.)−∆ log(GSP.t), where ∆ log(GSPi.) is
the average growth rate of GSP for a state in all years in the sample and ∆ log(GSP.t)
is the average growth rate of GSP for all states in a year. ν.,t are time fixed effects.
The β coefficients will be weighted averages of the year-by-year cross-sectional re-
gressions. The time fixed effects capture year-specific impacts on nation-wide growth
rates such as shocks to Gross Domestic Product.
The variance of the data series vary significantly across states due to the fact that
shocks to some states are more volatile more those to other states. Following the
two-step procedure in ASY (1996) to correct for heteroskedasticity. In the first step
I run a panel Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation. For the residuals I estimate
the variance of the error terms in the regression assuming that it varies by state. In
the second step the variables are weighted by the estimated standard error for the
state.
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2.5 Results
Table 1 is the main results. 40.1 percent of shocks to gross state product are not
smoothed. The estimated standard error indicates it is statistically significant. This
finding is consistent with the real wage rigidity literature and evidence against the
spot market model.
Decomposition of wage income smoothing show a significant part of shocks to
gross state product is absorbed by employer. I interpret it as employers maintain
the wage income of their employees. The amount of smoothing accomplished by net
taxes is 1.8 percent and that smoothed by interstate commuting is 3 percent. The
total amount of smoothing through the three channels is 59.9 percent.
Further Channel of Wage Income Smoothing
Next I further decompose the amount of shocks to gross state products into two
parts:wage income per capita can be further smoothed by higher unemployment
rate. Note the identity of wage income per capita:
Wage per capita =
Total Wage and Salary
Population
=
Total Wage and Salary
Employment
Employment
Population
(2.13)
I suppress the subscripts of year and state. By regressing the two components sep-
arately against gross state product, the unsmoothed shocks to wage and salary are
decomposed into two parts: those smoothed by higher unemployment rates and
shocks to wage per employed worker that are still not smoothed.
Table 2 shows the results for the new decomposition. Results for the three chan-
nels, net taxes, employers and interstate commuting, are the same as in Table 1. The
55
amount of smoothing of wage income per employed worker is 22.3 percent, while the
unsmoothed shocks to wage income per employed worker is 20.1 percent.
Subperiods
An interesting question is to check if the accomplished smoothing by each channel is
stable over time. Given that length of times series (48 years) I split the time series
of data into five subperiods.
The results are reported in Table 3. The shocks to gross state products ab-
sorbed by each channel changed considerably over the five subperiods. The period
1974-1983 is abnormal compared to other subperiods, when the shares of wage in-
come smoothing attributed to each channel are relatively stable. Notably employers
smooth around two-thirds of shocks in all the five periods except in the period 1974-
1983.
Different Frequency of Data If wage income smoothing is affected not only
by contemporaneous shocks to gross state product but also lagged shocks, then the
variance decomposition framework captures only part of the wage income smoothing
actually achieved. To test this I take difference of data at different frequencies–k-
differenced data means adjacent observations are k years apart. The amount of wage
income smoothing via each channel is stable across differing frequencies. The main
effect is that shocks to GSP that are not smoothed increase significantly, which is
largely due to smoothing by employers drops by around 20%. This may reflect the
fact that employers do not commit to the size of payroll for long if states are hit by
negative shocks several years in a row.
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Lag Adjustment of Wage Income to GSP Shocks The adjustment of wage
income to GSP shocks may not be instantaneous or symmetric. Due to the fact that
typical labor contracts are signed for multiple years, employers can adjust the pay
level of their workforce gradually. Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert (1997) test the
the asymmetrical response of gasoline prices to crude oil price changes. Similarly I
model asymmetric responses of wage income growth to GSP shocks as follows:
∆ log(Wagei,t) = β
+
0 ∆ log(GSPi,t)
∆ log(Wagei,t+1) = β
+
1 ∆ log(GSPi,t)
∆ log(Wagei,t+n) = β
+
n ∆ log(GSPi,t)
(2.14)
if ∆ log(GSPi,t) > 0, and
∆ log(Wagei,t) = β
−
0 ∆ log(GSPi,t)
∆ log(Wagei,t+1) = β
−
1 ∆ log(GSPi,t)
∆ log(Wagei,t+n) = β
−
n ∆ log(GSPi,t)
(2.15)
if ∆ log(GSPi,t) < 0. Also define
∆ log(GSPi,t)
+
= max
(
∆ log(GSPi,t), 0
)
∆ log(GSPi,t)
−
= min
(
∆ log(GSPi,t), 0
)
.
(2.16)
A simple empirical model that allows for asymmetric adjustment can be written
∆ log(Wagei,t) =
n∑
i=0
(
β+i ∆ log(GSPi,t−i)
+
+ β−i ∆ log(GSPi,t−i)
−
)
+ εit, (2.17)
where ε is assumed to be an iid error term.
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Results are shown in Table 5 and Table 6. Comparing the two tables, it is easy to
see that responses of wage income to positive and negative GSP shocks are different.
For 1 percent positive shock to the idiosyncratic growth rate of GSP in a state, the
response of same year idiosyncratic growth rate of wage income is 0.324 percent,
while for 1 percent negative shock it is -0.401 percent. The accumulative change
after three years for the former is 0.40 percent whereas -0.704 percent for the latter.
In other words, wage income responds stronger and faster to negative GSP shocks
than positive ones, which is a reversed “rockets and feathers” feature. This finding
does not lend support to the mobility risk-sharing contract model.
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2.6 Conclusion
I find that a considerable amount of shocks to GSP are smoothed via the three
channels: net taxes, employer and interstate commuting. They smooth 1.8%, 55.1%
and 3.0%, respectively, of shocks to GSP. Employers are the most important shock
absorber. By further decomposing the unsmoothed shocks, I find that unemployment
is another channel of smoothing wage income of employed workers. Shocks to wage
income per capita that are not smoothed are 40.1%, whereas only 20.1% of shocks to
wage income per employer worker are not smoothed. This pattern of wage income
smoothing is persistent in all five subperiods except the period 1974-1983. It is also
robust to different frequencies of data. Finally, I find that there is reversed “rockets
and feather” feature in smoothing shocks to GSP. Wage income responds stronger
and faster to negative shocks to GSP.
It would be interesting to further explore the heterogeneity in wage income
smoothing. How much of the wage income smoothing is achieved by top earners ver-
sus average earners, especially over the business cycle? Do the two groups of workers
exhibit different dynamics and sensitivities to positive economic shocks when top
earners enjoy higher mobility and can easily find more favorable job offers. These
questions cannot be answered using state level aggregate data. Combining firm-level
wage survey and macro data may shed more light on these questions.
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Figure 2.1: Idiosyncratic Growth Rates of GSP and Wage Income in Alaska
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Figure 2.2: Idiosyncratic Growth Rates of GSP and Wage Income in New York
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Figure 2.3: Idiosyncratic Growth Rates of GSP and Wage Income in Texas
-
.
1
-
.
05
0
.
05
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
year
g_gsp g_wage
62
Table 2.1: Channels of Wage Income Smoothing (Percent)
Net Taxes (βT ) 1.8
(0.4)
Employer (βE) 55.1
(1.2)
Interstate Commuting (βC) 3.0
(0.4)
Not Smoothed (βU) 40.1
(1.1)
Notes: Percentages of shocks to gross state product absorbed at each level of smoothing. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
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Table 2.2: Smoothing of Employed Workers’ Wage Income by Unemployment Rate
Net Taxes (βT ) 1.8
(0.4)
Employer (βE) 55.1
(1.2)
Interstate Commuting (βC) 3.0
(0.4)
Unemployment (βUR) 22.3
(0.8)
Not Smoothed (βU) 20.1
(0.8)
Notes: Percentages of shocks to gross state product absorbed at each level of smoothing. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
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Table 2.3: Channels of Wage Income Smoothing in Five Decades (Percent)
Channel 1964-
1973
1974-
1983
1984-
1993
1994-
2003
2004-
2010
Net Taxes (βT ) -1.3 9.2 -6.5 4.4 6.3
Employer (βE) 64.8 35.5 70.0 74.1 64.8
Interstate Commuting (βC) 1.2 7.0 0.7 0.9 0.3
Not Smoothed (βU) 35.3 48.2 35.8 29.4 28.8
Notes: Percentages of shocks to gross state product absorbed at each level of smoothing in five
subperiods. Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 2.4: Channels of Wage Income Smoothing, Different Frequencies
Channel 3-year Lag 5-year Lag 10-year Lag
Net Taxes (βT ) 3.95 3.93 3.94
(0.34) (0.31) (0.27)
Employer (βE) 35.87 34.55 34.7
(1.10) (0.99) (0.91)
Interstate Commuting (βC) 3.19 2.24 3.46
(0.33) (0.31) (0.27)
Not Smoothed (βU) 56.99 59.28 57.93
(1.03) (0.97) (0.90)
Notes: Percentages of shocks to gross state product absorbed at each level of smoothing. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
66
Table 2.5: Lag Adjustment of Wage Income Smoothing
Dependent Variables Reg 1 Reg 2
∆GSP0 0.383 0.359
(0.031) (0.037)
∆GSP1 0.238 0.106
(0.012) (0.025)
∆GSP2 0.035 0.013
(0.019) (0.032)
∆GSP3 -0.059 -0.017
(0.043) (0.036)
∆Wage1 0.370
(0.103)
∆Wage2 -0.158
(0.050)
∆Wage3 -0.034
(0.030)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 2200 2200
R2 0.515 0.580
Notes:. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 2.6: Asymmetric Lag Adjustment of Wage Income Smoothing
Dependent Variables Reg 1 Reg 2
∆GSP+0 0.324 0.317
(0.115) (0.111)
∆GSP+1 0.232 0.100
(0.025) (0.070)
∆GSP+2 -0.032 -0.071
(0.066) (0.076)
∆GSP+3 -0.152 -0.082
(0.088) (0.051)
∆GSP−0 0.401 0.363
(0.081) (0.092)
∆GSP−1 0.234 0.112
(0.011) (0.013)
∆GSP−2 0.076 0.064
(0.019) (0.018)
∆GSP−3 -0.007 0.028
(0.020) (0.031)
∆Wage1 0.360
(0.107)
∆Wage2 -0.159
(0.040)
∆Wage3 -0.050
(0.028)
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 2200 2200
R2 0.515 0.581
Notes:. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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